The Retaliation after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 According to New Historical Research by Bencsik, Péter
THE RETALIATION AFTER THE HUNGARIAN 
REVOLUTION OF 1956 ACCORDING TO NEW 







1956 and the historical sources 
Before discussing the historical problems of the post-1956 retaliation, I must say some 
words on the difficulties of interpreting its sources. It is evident, that during the Kádár-era 
no real investigation of these sources was possible. The revolution of 1956 was one of the 
biggest taboos of the communist regime, the main point of its ideology being the 
following sentence: „A counter-revolution took place in Hungary in 1956.” Therefore, 
historians were allowed to write on the events of 1956 as a counter-revolution and only 
 reliable’ historians had a possibility to get close to these sources at all. The research 
was made public and available to all historians only from 1989 as a peaceful transition 
took place in Hungary. Archives opened their gates and witnesses started to speak about 
their memories. 
However, there are many problems with these sources. Although there is a huge amount 
of written sources, the greatest bulk of it was made by the communist-led authorities 
(they are police, state security and court files, minutes of the party leadership etc.) This is 
no wonder: anti-communist fighters and other „illegal organizations are rarely 
documenting their activities for common reasons”.2 Another possibility is oral history. 
But the most important witnesses of the revolution were executed and those who survived 
had changed much during the thirty-two years of the Kádár-regime. After such a long 
time either in prison or in exile, most of their remembrance can be (and really is) 
distorted. It means that we have sources which are the least reliable  according to the 
historians.3 They are one-sided and incomplete, and this is why historians have to treat 
them very carefully and with a highly critical approach. 
In many cases, victims could not be rehabilitated based on  surviving court documents 
even after 1990. A judge must rely on the available court files to make a verdict – and 
upon these files the trials seem to be a fair procedure, although they can be camouflaged 
political trials. 
 
Koncepciós per: communist show trials and secret political trials 
The Hungarian legal history term koncepciós per is usually (but unfortunately 
mistakenly) translated to English as ‘show trial’. However, show trial means a public 
trial, which is constructed, (pre)determined and enforced by political power, usually with 
                                               
1 University of Szeged, Hungary.  
2 Tamás Meszerics, Politikai ellenállás ’45–56. Beszél, 2000/9–10. 
http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/politikai-ellenallas-’45–56 (accessed 15 Sept. 2012.) 
3 Ibid. 
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fabricated charges and it is quite similar to a theatre performance. In Hungarian using it is 
called kirakatper (literally, a ‘shopwindow trial’) which is only a type of koncepciós 
trials. Most of these trials were carried out secretly and this is why I would like to avoid 
using the term ‘show trial’. Koncepciós per means a trial with a political (pre)conception, 
where the aim of the process is not to find out the truth but to fulfill a political goal. In 
most cases, the confession of witnesses and the defendant was written and learned by 
heart and this was true even with the verdict. In short, every show trial is koncepciós, but 
not every koncepciós trial is a show trial, because it can be also a secret political trial. 
One of the main questions historians have to deal with is whether these post-1956 trials 
were koncepciós or not. In this study I try to summarize the historical debate about this 
topic. 
 
Retaliation after 1956 
Although the government of János Kádár made several statements that no one will be 
punished due to the fact that he or she participated in the ‘events’, the retorsion started as 
early as in November 1956. The first phase was characterized by unlawful acts carried out 
by the freshly founded party militia and the Soviet KGB. These acts included 
deportations (even to the Soviet Union), internment, beatings and other sadistic tortures, 
mass killings by volley-firing etc. The first trials were carried out from December 1956 
and in the beginning they were often open to the public – but not classic show trials. 
What is more, solicitors usually cited Kádár’s earlier statements on not only the impunity 
mentioned above, but also his words on „the glorious revolution of our people”. These 
brave solicitors were later kept away from the retaliatory trials or even fired. No wonder 
that the effects of these trials were not too impressive to the party leadership. So, these 
trials cannot be considered as show trials: neither solicitors, nor the defendants behaved 
as actors, no one gave them full texts to learn by heart and perform them before the court. 
As they were not show trials, does it mean they were not koncepciós either? The answer 
to this question is not easy, because these trials were ordered by the party leadership and 
they had a political aim. 
In the later stage, trials became closed. Solicitors and judges were selected with much 
more care. New kinds of special tribunals were created. First, martial law was declared, 
then „accelerated” proceedings were introduced (i. e. trials without indictment). Finally, 
people’s tribunals were set up again, first in April in Budapest then in June in another 
four cities to deal with the acts of the „counter-revolutionaries”. These new tribunals were 
created by decrees of the Presidium of the People’s Republic and not by laws. Their main 
points were the following: they wanted to mix political and common crimes, capital 
punishment was expected in most cases, indictment was not necessary. People’s tribunals 
had much more severe peculiarities: they formed their judgments with retroactive effect, 
appeals were not possible in some cases, and reformatio in peius was possible even when 
only the defendant or the solicitor made an appeal – and therefore the decision of the 
court of appeal could have been amended to a worse one. Solicitors were to be chosen 
from a list created by the party officials; naturally, only ‘sound’ and ‘reliable’ lawyers 
were selected.4 
                                               
4 See Frigyes Kahler, Joghalál Magyarországon 1945–1989. Zrínyi, Budapest, 1993. 40–41.; 
Tibor Zinner, A kádári megtorlás rendszere. Hamvas Intézet, Budapest, 2001. 105–160. 
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From mid-1957, trials were not public anymore, they were implemented behind closed 
doors (partly because of international outcry). Most trials (and capital punishments) were 
carried out in 1957 and 1958, including the most famous one, the trial of Imre Nagy, the 
prime minister of the revolution, who was sentenced to death and executed in June 1958. 
The number of executed people is disputed, but most historians claim that there were 229 
death penalties. However, others state that this number is somewhere between 400 and 
500. Most of the 229 executed who are known by name were young men (usually under 
35), fighting as armed rebels. To the astonishment of the party leadership, they were 
mostly workers and therefore members of the ‘ruling’ working class. They were charged 
with plotting against people’s democratic order, armed rebellion and/or murder. 
During the 1990s, two points of view developed among researchers relating these 
retaliatory trials. Historians at the 1956 Institute claimed that these trials were not 
koncepciós, or at least not ‘constructed’, although they had koncepciós elements. This 
standpoint suggests that there is a big difference between the ‘classic’ (pre-1956) 
koncepciós trials and post-1956 retaliatory trials. In the classic trials, confessions were 
forced, victims were tortured both physically and mentally. After 1956, beatings and 
other sadistic act were not common or even only accidental. However, mental or 
psychological torture was general. Classic trials were based on fabricated charges only 
but retaliatory trials were not constructed, charges were based on real facts committed by 
the fighters or ‘rebels’. In the first half of the 1950s, everyone could have been a victim of 
these trials; however, the main problem for the communist authorities after the revolution 
was that the number of the ‘enemies’ (i. e. the revolutionaries) was so high that neither 
the tribunals nor the prisons could cope with such a big mass of ‘criminals’. So, it was not 
likely that innocent people were accused as there were plenty of ‘dangerous counter-
revolutionaries’ available. There were also big differences between the juridical 
independence of these two periods. Judges were not independent at all before 1956. After 
the revolution, however, they had some room to maneuver and became at least partly 
independent. In a classic trial, defendants had to prove their innocence, but later the 
courts at least tried to prove they were guilty. Post-1956 trials were not entirely false, but 
the facts they contained were distorted and stripped of their original meaning.5 
Other researchers, who are mainly jurists, stated that many of these trials were entirely 
koncepciós and even constructed. One of them, Frigyes Kahler even tried to redefine the 
term koncepciós trial. According to him, every trial is koncepciós, which has a political 
aim (instead of wanting to reveal the truth) and for that reason, facts in the indictment 
were fictional and/or unfounded. He thinks that even those trials were koncepciós, which 
were based on non-moral laws or decrees or in which the rules of criminal procedure 
were hurt.6 He also adds that trials and verdicts in both periods were class-orientated: it 
means that the sentence was different due to not only the crimes ‘committed’ but also 
class origin. So, if the accused one was a worker, his punishment was less than someone 
who was considered to be a ‘class-enemy’ (e. g. of bourgeois or aristocratic origin). 
                                               
5 Attila Szakolczai, Az ’56-os politikai perek. Rubicon, 1995/6–7. 42–45.; László Eörsi, Válogatás 
1998 történelmi dokumentumfilmjeibl. Ki volt Tóth Ilona? In: Évkönyv 1999. 1956-os Intézet, 
Budapest, 1999. 363–374.; László Eörsi, Koncepciós perek? História 2006/10. 44–46.  
6 Frigyes Kahler, Adalékok a forradalom utáni koncepciós perek kérdéséhez. A Brusznyai-per 
tanulságai. [Conference presentation at the XXth Century Institute, 22 Oct. 2003.] 
http://www.xxszazadintezet.hu/rendezvenyek/tudomanyos_konferencia_az_1956/kahler_frigyes
_adalekok_a_forr.html (accessed 20 Sept. 2012.) 
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Emotional debates and new (?) interpretation of historical sources 
Several historical debates went on between the above mentioned two views (or rather, 
two schools or even two camps). These quarrels usually indulged in personalities.7 
Without commenting these disputes it is worth noticing that originally they went on 
between the two camps. The sharpest controversies arose from the case of Ilona Tóth, one 
of the female victims of the retaliation, who was executed in June 1957. According to the 
charges, she and her two male fellow-revolutionaries brutally killed a man in a hospital 
where Tóth worked as a medical student. She was also the head of a resistance group 
which issued thousands of political leaflets and also an illegal newspaper after Kádár 
came to power. László Eörsi, a historian from the 1956 Institute believes that they indeed 
commit this manslaughter. However, they did it only to protect the revolution as they 
thought the man was a communist spy – there was a photo of him dressed in the uniform 
of the hated ÁVH, the political police of the dictatorship. So, Tóth must be considered to 
be one of the heroes of 1956, says even Eörsi. The other party (including Gábor Jobbágyi, 
Réka Kiss and Sándor M. Kiss) firmly believes in Tóth’s innocence: they claim that the 
24-year-old girl was tortured and this is why she confessed to the murder.8 
More recently, however, the debate restarted between two historians from the first 
school who were both fellow-workers of the 1956 Institute. First, Attila Szakolczai 
accused László Eörsi that he was misinterpreting the historical sources of 1956. As he 
noted, Eörsi “became a victim of the Kádárist texts”.9 As Eörsi read many sources from 
1957 and 1958, he took over their interpretation as well, although in a reversed way (i. e. 
changing the word counter-revolution to revolution etc.), stated Szakolczai. It was not 
only Eörsi who tried to defend himself but also other historians and even a surviving 
revolutionary did so – while others supported Szakolczai’s opinion.10 The discussion soon 
became emotionally motivated again. Its background was the different attitude to the 
                                               
7 Some examples: Gábor Jobbágyi, Ez itt a vértanúk vére. Kairosz, Budapest, 1998.; Attila 
Szakolczai, Szegény történelem. Beszél, 1999/6. http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/szegeny-
tortenelem; Gábor Jobbágyi, Szegény 1956-os Intézet, szegény Szakolczai Attila. Beszél, 
1999/8. http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/szegeny-1956-os-intezet-szegeny-szakolczai-attila; Eszter 
Zsófia Tóth, Két könyv a megtorlásról. In: Évkönyv 1999. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 1999. 375–
383. 
8 Gábor Jobbágyi, A néma talp. Tóth Ilona az orvosi kar mártírja. Püski, Budapest, 2002.; László 
Eörsi, Jobbágyi Gábor: A néma talp. Élet és Irodalom, 2002/38., 24.; László Eörsi, Tóth Ilona. 
Valóság és mítosz. Beszél, 2002/6. http://beszelo.c3.hu/02/06/11eorsi.htm; Réka Kiss – Sándor 
M. Kiss, A csalogány elszállt. Tóth Ilona tragikuma. Kairosz, Budapest, 2007.; Eörsi László, 
„Ott, akkor és úgy…” Beszél, 2007/10. 71–80. http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/„ott-akkor-es-
ugy…” (accessed 20 Sept. 2012.) 
9 Attila Szakolczai, Népköztársaság tér, 2007. Élet és Irodalom, 2007/20. A more detailed critical 
study under the same title is also available: 
http://www.rev.hu/rev/htdocs/hu/tanulmanyok/1956/nepkoztarsasagter_sza.pdf (Accessed 20 
Sept. 2012.) 
10 László Eörsi, Köztársaság tér 1956–2007. Élet és Irodalom, 2007/22. 
http://www.es.hu/eorsi_laszlo;koztarsasag_ter_1956-2007;2007-06-03.html; Éva Standeisky, Így 
azért ne! Élet és Irodalom, 2007/22. http://www.es.hu/standeisky_eva;igy_azert_ne;2007-06-
03.html; Radnai György, A szemtanú jogai. Élet és Irodalom, 2007/26. 
http://www.es.hu/kereses/szerzo/Radnai György; Tibor Takács, A források tere. Élet és 
Irodalom, 2007/24. http://www.es.hu/takacs_tibor;a_forrasok_tere;2007-06-17.html  
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sources. Eörsi believes that the investigation methods of the Kádár regime changed 
significantly comparing to the pre-1956 koncepciós trials and therefore retaliatory sources 
tell us mainly the truth – Szakolczai states that they are completely false and/or 
manipulated, so one has to be much more critical to them.  
To demonstrate his truth, Szakolczai chose a single trial and investigated it 
meticulously. It is the case of another famous (or even infamous) female victim of the 
retaliation, Piroska Jankó (who was not sentenced to death, contrary to Ilona Tóth). 
According to her verdict, she killed an officer on 30 October 1956 with a knife. There 
were rumours that she (or the mob around her) even tore out the heart of the colonel. 
(This story was so fabulous that it was left out even from the charges.) Szakolczai 
examined the surviving sources very carefully. His method is similar to Frigyes Kahler, 
Réka Kiss and Sándor M. Kiss:11 instead of a brief survey of a great bulk of sources 
(which seems to be Eörsi’s method as he was able to produce a whole new book on 
different rebel groups in almost every year reading the minutes of the investigations and 
court files of several trials12), he made a very detailed search, e. g. comparing the 
confessions of witnesses and the defendant and even those told by the same person but at 
another time. Doing so, he found a lot of antagonisms and falsifications. The minutes 
were not written word by word, it was always the investigator who wrote a ‘summary’ of 
what he was told (or, more precisely, of what he expected or hoped he was told). Even 
from these distorted texts it is obvious that the investigators manipulated the witnesses 
and Jankó: not only distorting their words but also giving the words into their mouths. As 
Szakolczai tried to find out the truth, he had to work like solving a puzzle – what is more, 
there were several wrong or false piece among them. There were a lot of problems during 
the investigation. First, Jankó was accused of killing János Asztalos, in which she pleaded 
guilty. Soon it became obvious that Asztalos was not stabbed and Jankó readily agreed 
that her victim was another colonel named József Papp. Although he was really stabbed, 
he was also shot and his death was due to these shots. Contrary to this fact, Jankó was 
still charged with murder. However, Szakolczai even believes that she did not stab the 
dead colonel and was therefore completely innocent.13  
Eörsi responded quickly, claiming that Jankó did stab the (living or already dead) 
colonel, so she killed or at least wanted to kill him. According to Eörsi, neither this, nor 
the most of the post-1956 trials were koncepciós. The authorities wanted to find out the 
truth (with some minor exceptions), states Eörsi.14 In his response, Szakolczai writes that 
Eörsi does not care about the details: he thinks that Papp could have been alive when 
                                               
11 See Frigyes Kahler, A Brusznyai-per. Emberi sorsok a politikai megtorlás idején. Kairosz, 
[Budapest], [1998]. Kiss – M. Kiss, op. cit. 
12 Eörsi’s most important books are the following: Ferencváros 1956. A kerület fegyveres 
csoportjai. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 1997.; Corvinisták 1956. A VIII. kerület fegyveres 
csoportjai. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2001.; Mítoszok helyett – 1956. Noran, Budapest, 2003.; 
Széna tériek 1956. 1956-os Intézet–Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára, Budapest, 
2004.; Köztársaság tér 1956. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2006.; Angyalföld 1956. Emberek, 
sorsok, emlékek. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2006. (with co-authors);  A „Baross-köztársaság”. A 
VII. kerületi felkelcsoportok, L’Harmattan, Budapest, 2011. 
13 Attila Szakolczai, Szegény Jankó Piroska. In: Évkönyv 2008. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2008. 
279–374. 
14 László Eörsi, Koncepciós mítoszrombolás. Beszél, 2010/1. 
http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/koncepcios-mitoszrombolas (accessed 23 Sept. 2012.) 
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Jankó could have possibly stabbed him, although he was shot by several bullets (which 
went through his brain and also his heart). He also underlines that “(until now) I have 
never called the post-1956 retaliatory proceedings koncepciós trials” but now he thinks 
that “there were koncepciós trials after 1956 but most proceedings were preconceptual”.15 
In short, Szakolczai had changed his mind and accepted the view that many trials after 
1956 were constructed, i. e. koncepciós. So he joined to the opinion of those whom he 
criticized some years before. Eörsi was glad to cite Szakolczai’s earlier statements on his 
homepage (with a malicious remark)16 – but I think if someone changes his opinion due 
to facts which he had not known previously is not a shame. 
Szakolczai wrote a remark also on the case of Ilona Tóth. As he pointed out: “I have 
never taken a commitment on this issue previously with such clarity”, but after he had 
read the book of Réka Kiss and Sándor M. Kiss, he was convinced that Tóth was 
innocent. He even suggests that the two cases are very similar (i. e. they might have the 
same concept [koncepció] behind them): both were young girls, sentenced in the first half 
of 1957 by the same tribunal; both of them pleaded guilty, were charged by murder 
committed very similarly: they stabbed a knife to the chest of a tortured, half-naked man 
who was possibly not alive when they did so etc.17 
I am not a researcher of these retaliatory trials. However, one thing can be understood 
quite simply from the debate (or, rather, from the quarrel). Both historians are partly right 
but neither wants to understand the other point of view. Both of them misinterpret one 
another. Nevertheless, Szakolczai’s arguments seem to be more convincing. It seems that 
historians must do a closer analysis and a more detailed research. It is certain that we will 
never know the whole truth but I agree with Szakolczai: researchers have to try to get rid 
of the Kádárist framework of interpretation. But in a sense Eörsi is right, too: retaliatory 
trials do differ from the classic koncepciós trials. Altogether, these differences seem to be 
smaller than we thought previously. 
 
                                               
15 Attila Szakolczai, Piroska és farkasai. Beszél, 2010/2–3. http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/piroska-
es-farkasai (accessed 23 Sept. 2012.) 
16 László Eörsi: Koncepciós mítoszrombolás III. 
http://www.eorsilaszlo.hu/eorsilaszlo.hu/el/cikkek/elegyes/326.doc (accessed 23 Sept. 2012). The 
debate went on for a while even in Beszél, but it became again highly emotional and endulged in 
personalities (including both parties). 
17 Attila Szakoczai, Itt a mítosz, hol a mítosz?! Beszél, 2010/4. http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/itt-a-
mitosz-hol-a-mitosz (accessed 23 Sept. 2012.) 
